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DISCUSSION
The funeral of CBDR in the climate
change regime
Despite some progress, the draft elements of the future agreement on climate change may
serve as the gravestone to the common but differentiated responsibility principle when it
comes to climate.
There is no denying the fact that the so-called developed countries (this problematic
term is used here as it is used in the relevant instruments, probably to handle the many
groups of states involved in negotiations) historically did contribute more to global
warming than the so-called developing countries. In order to reflect this fact and to
strengthen the position of the developed countries in international negotiations, the
principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR) has been used. It is said to
be a binding principle of the international law on climate change. In general, the principle
could be read in two different ways: It could be a mere statement of the different
historical contributions to the common problem of climate change without entailing any
commitments. This would contradict the understanding as a binding principle of climate
change law. The other interpretation would be that the different historical contributions
to the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere entail also different
obligations to tackle the common problem. This would confirm the classification as a
binding principle. With regard to the international regime on climate change the relevant
treaty law called for the latter interpretation. The UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) imposes different obligations on developed and developing countries.
Only the former have to limit their greenhouse gas emissions. The latter enjoy flexibility
regarding their information obligations. Furthermore only developed country Parties are
obliged to support developing country Parties financially and technologically.
Additionally the obligation of developing country Parties to implement the convention
depends on this transfer of technology and financial means. Thus the Convention
imposes more strict mitigation obligations on developed countries. They also have to
support developing countries so that the latter can implement the Convention, too. The
Kyoto Protocol with its specified emission reduction targets only for Annex I-Parties to
the Convention calls for an obligation-oriented understanding of the CBDR principle, as
well. Hence the treaties on climate change implemented the CBDR principle by imposing
different obligations on different parties, thereby providing for an obligation-oriented
understanding of the CBDR principle. This understanding of the principle in climate
change law might change because of the regime on emission limitation obligations in the
draft agreement.
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The draft elements of the future agreement are annexed to the Lima Call for Climate
Action. Although there will be differences in the eventual agreement, the draft shows
already options, how the CBDR principle might develop. It is mentioned quite often (21
times) in the text and certainly influences the obligations of the different Parties: The
general goals of achieving a low greenhouse gas emission economy and limiting the
global temperature increase to at least 2°C are formulated with references to CBDR.
Similarly the usual methods to implement CBDR are part of the draft: there are
differentiated commitments regarding the mitigation of climate change (No. 16.4).
Developed countries shall support developing countries in adapting to a changing climate
environment (Nos. 25 et seq.). Probably, developed countries will be obliged to support
developing countries with technology-transfer and capacity-building (Nos. 56 and 58).
More or less explicitly the draft states that developing countries will be able to
implement the agreement only with financial support of developed countries (both
Options of No. 34 regarding the general regulation on finance). Developed and developing
countries have different reporting obligations (e.g. in No. 68). All commonly used
methods of implementing CBDR can be found in the draft agreement.
However, the foundation of the CBDR principle as interpreted in climate change law
today is responsibility. It entails the common obligation to mitigate climate change but
differentiates in the extent of this obligation. There has to be a tangible commitment to
reduce the emission of green house gases. It is questionable, whether this obligation-
oriented interpretation will be implemented in the future agreement. There are positive
signs: twice a global emission budget is mentioned, which shall be divided between all
Parties according to different criteria (No. 5 Option 4 as part of the objective of the
agreement and No. 13.2 b. as long-term aspects of mitigation. Regarding the latter there
is no alternative option.). This would implement the idea of CBDR quite successfully,
following demands that have been uttered since the beginning of international
negotiations on climate change.
Yet the chances of this idea to finally come into being seem quite small. The whole draft
is tainted with the idea of nationally determined commitments that will somehow add up
to the desired emission pathway. This procedural change from internationally
determined maximum amounts of greenhouse gas emissions (cap and trade procedure)
to voluntary national mitigation contributions with reviews at the next COP/MOP
(procedure of pledges and reviews) has been introduced into the negotiations at COP
15/MOP 5 in Copenhagen. In the draft agreement the whole section on mitigation
commitments rests on the idea of voluntary pledges. Every option on the global
mitigation goal allocates the main influence on the contributions to the Parties. They
shall either nationally determine their commitments (No. 16 Option 1), or communicate
and implement successive mitigation commitments (Option 2) or prepare differentiated
commitments (Option 3). Thus each state defines its own contribution to the limiting of
greenhouse gas emissions. That finding is underlined by the draft regulation No. 73 on
the scope of commitments. Option 1 includes the possibility that the scope of the
commitments will be determined by the agreement, but also the alternative, namely
national determination of the commitments. Option 2 defines only the substantial scope
of implementation and ambition, which shall cover mitigation as well as finance,
technology and capacity-building support to developing countries for developed
countries and mitigation and/or adaptation for developed countries. According to this
option, the future agreement would be implemented through national reduction pledges
only. Thus only one alternative of Option 1 foresees an internationally determined
emission cap.
It seems as if the negotiators departed from the idea of a responsibility shared by all
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states and turned to a reading of the CBDR principle that allows every State Party to
determine itself its share of the common burden. The idea of piling up national pledges is
in conflict with the recent understanding of the CBDR principle in climate change law.
Recent nationally determined pledges, according to the International Panel on Climate
Change, will not suffice to reach a 50% chance of meeting the 2°C goal, they merely will
not foreclose meeting this goal. Thus states once again try to circumvent the deep truth
that in order to mitigate climate change we all have to cut emissions and therefore need
to restructure our economies. This leads to the conclusion that the common
responsibility to tackle climate change is sacrificed in order to make as many states as
possible ratify the future agreement. However, what is the worth of an international
regime that has the task of mitigating climate change but is designed so that the goal
cannot be reached?
A response to this contribution can be found here.
Katrin Kohoutek is a PhD candidate and research assistant at the Walther Schücking
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